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Abstract—Consider an ad hoc network where packet trans-
missions occur between the nodes. Optimal flow allocation in such
systems can be modelled as a constrained nonlinear optimisation
problem. This problem can be solved either by standard methods
which assume global knowledge of the system being modelled, or
by a distributed algorithm which assumes local knowledge only.
We consider an ad hoc network which contains selfish nodes.
A selfish node cares only about maximising its own flows and
does not care about the utility that any other nodes get. Flow
allocation in a network of altruistic and selfish nodes can be
modelled as a constrained nonlinear optimisation problem and
solved by standard methods. However, in this case a dynamic
algorithm to compute the network flows in not available.
We modify the behaviour of the selfish nodes so that a dy-
namic solution is possible. In this scheme, selfish nodes advertise
false (inflated) resource prices to the other nodes. These nodes
respond by not routing their flows through the selfish nodes, and
the selfish nodes can now can use all their resources to transmit
their own flows. The flows return to their optimal values if the
selfish nodes subsequently advertise the correct prices for their
resources.
Altruistic nodes can detect the inflated prices charged by the
selfish nodes and respond by advertising false (inflated) prices to
the selfish nodes. In this case the flows originating at the selfish
nodes are reduced, but the flows do not return to their optimal
values. This scheme also has a distributed solution.
Keywords—Ad hoc networks, dynamic algorithms, flow alloca-
tion, Lagrangian optimisation, selfish users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc networks are self-configuring networks of mobile
nodes connected by wireless links. They enable infrastructure-
free communication: no fixed equipment is needed, instead
each node acts as a router. Although a node benefits from
transmitting and receiving its own flows, a node does not
benefit from forwarding traffic on behalf of other nodes.
However, if the nodes do not act as transit nodes, then the
ad hoc network would fail to function. Therefore a crucial
question is: how can the nodes be given incentives to act as
transit nodes?
This question has received much attention in the literature
(see [3] and the references therein). Crowcroft et al. [1] present
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such an incentive scheme where each node has a credit balance
that determines how much the node can spend on transmission
resources in the next time interval. For each node there are two
resources: bandwidth and power, each with its own price. The
price of each resource increases when the resource is scarce,
and decreases when the resource is abundant. The resource
prices determine the cost of sending a unit of flow end-to-end
along a route, which in turn determines the flow along the
route. The flows that originate, terminate and transit at a node
determine the price of resources at that node. The interplay
between the prices, flow allocations, and credit balances is such
that global stability of the system is achieved. Importantly, such
a scheme is decentralized: no central controller is needed, and
the scheme therefore has favourable scalability properties [2].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents a simple mathematical model [3] for flow
allocation in an ad hoc network. Under the assumption that
every node is willing to cooperate, [3] derives the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker equations that define the socially-optimal flows
on each of the routes. Section III defines a model [3] where a
selfish node, the egoist, cares only about maximising its utility,
and solves for the optimal flows in this model.
The flow allocation problem in networks of altruistic nodes
can be solved by both centralised and by distributed methods.
Centralised methods require global knowledge of the system
to be solved, distributed methods need only local knowledge.
Flow allocation in a network containing both altruistic and
selfish nodes can be modelled as a constrained nonlinear
optimisation problem and solved by standard methods.
In Section IV we modify the behaviour of the selfish nodes
so that a distributed solution is possible. In this scheme the
selfish nodes advertise false (inflated) resource prices to the
other nodes. As a result, the altruistic nodes do not route their
flows through the selfish nodes, and the selfish nodes now can
use all their resources to transmit their own flows. The selfish
nodes benefit by being able to send larger flows, the altruistic
nodes are disadvantaged in that their flows are reduced, and
the network experiences a lower total utility.
Suppose the altruistic nodes can detect the inflated prices
charged by the selfish nodes. Suppose further that the altru-
istic nodes respond to the selfish nodes by advertising false
(inflated) prices to the selfish nodes while advertising correct
prices to the altruistic nodes. This will cause the flows originat-
ing from the selfish nodes to be reduced, but the network flows
will not necessarily return to their socially-optimal values.
This scheme has a distributed solution. Section V demonstrates
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the usefulness of the distributed solution approach, where we
define a time-varying utility function and solve for the time-
varying resource prices. Conclusions are presented in Section
VI.
II. A MODEL FOR FLOW ALLOCATION
Consider a simple model where the positions of all nodes
are fixed, and where the path chosen for communication
between any origin and destination is also fixed. The model
assumes that the nodes communicate with each other by
transmitting continuous ‘flows’. In reality, flows are made up
of discrete packets. However, for situations where the packet
size is small compared to the total volume of data transferred,
the continuous model can be appropriate. Refer to [3] for a
complete description of the flow allocation model.
The network model consists of j ∈ J nodes. Each route
r ∈ R is defined by an ordered subset of nodes. Route r has
source node s(r), destination node d(r) and a set t(r) of transit
nodes. Let RS(j), RD(j) and RT (j) denote the sets of routes
for which j is the source, the destination or a transit node
respectively. Let νs, νd and νt denote the rate at which battery
energy is consumed per unit flow at node j when j is a source
node, a destination node and a transit node respectively. Let
Pj denote the maximum power (the rate per unit time at which
battery energy can be used) at node j.
Let Ur(y) denote the utility derived by the originating node
when a flow y is transmitted on route r. The socially-optimal
flows y = (yr)r∈R are found by solving the optimisation
problem
max
y
∑
r∈R
Ur(yr) (1)
subject to the constraints yr ≥ 0 for r ∈ R (the flows are
non-negative) and
νs
∑
r∈RS(j)
yr + νd
∑
r∈RD(j)
yr + νt
∑
r∈RT (j)
yr ≤ Pj
for j ∈ J (the flows originating from, terminating at and
transiting through node j cannot use more that Pj units of
power at node j).
Eqn. (1) involves the maximization of a strictly concave
function over a convex region and so there exists a unique
solution.
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for optimality
yield 2R+ J equations for the flows yr, the Lagrange multi-
pliers ηr for the flow constraints, and the Lagrange multipliers
ξj for the power constraints. The 2R + J simultaneous non-
linear equations can be solved for example by using the code
provided in [6] or by using the NLP package CFSQP [4].
These are centralized solution methods. Alternatively, we can
design a dynamic algorithm to solve the KKT equations: this
is a distributed solution method.
A. A distributed solution of the social optimum
A dynamic algorithm can be designed to derive the
socially-optimal flows based upon the KKT conditions. This
algorithm has the advantage in that it is distributed in the
sense that a source node only needs to know the values of the
Lagrange multipliers at the nodes along a route. The algorithm
was presented in [3] and was adapted from the distributed
dynamic approach of Crowcroft et al. [1]. First, compute the
power in use at node i at time t−∆
pi(t−∆) = νs
∑
r∈RS(i)
yr(t−∆) (2)
+ νd
∑
r∈RD(i)
yr(t−∆) + νt
∑
r∈RT (i)
yr(t−∆)
where yr(t −∆) is the flow on route r at time t −∆. Next,
the price ξi(t) of power at node i at time t is given by the DE
d
dt
ξi(t) = κ ξi(t)
pi(t)− Pi
Pi
(3)
where κ is a constant and Pi is the power available at node i.
A discretised version of the DE (3) yields
ξi(t) = ξi(t−∆)(1−∆κ(1 − pi(t−∆)/Pi)). (4)
The cost of sending a unit of flow along route r at time t is
ωr(t) = νs ξo(r)(t) + νd ξd(r)(t) + νt
∑
j∈t(r)
ξj(t). (5)
Finally, the flow yr(t) on route r at time t (given a logarithmic
utility function) is
yr(t) = 1/ωr(t). (6)
Repeated application of Eqns (2) through (6), starting from
yr(0) = 0 for all r ∈ R and ξj(0) = 1 for all j ∈ J , causes
the dynamical system (y(t), ξ(t)) to converge to the solution
of the KKT equations, which was demonstrated in [3].
Note that node i requires a knowledge only of its own
power usage to update its price ξi(t) according to Eq. (4) and
route r requires only a knowledge of the prices of power at
the nodes along route r to set its flow according to Eqns. (5)
and (6). Thus, the algorithm can be implemented without the
nodes having to know global information.
B. Some examples of the distributed solution
An important property of the dynamical solution is that the
system can adapt to changes to the network topology. Consider
a network model [1] with ten nodes located at random on a
100m× 100m plane. Two nodes are connected by a link if
they are within 50m of each other. The network has 50 uni-
directional links. Each node has a battery of power 0.5W .
Simulations [5] were run in which new users were introduced
to the network part-way through the simulation. In all cases, it
was found that the system successfully adapted and converged
to the new optimal solution. Fig. 1 illustrates a simulation
in which a new user is introduced to the network after 1000
iterations. The system quickly adapts and converges to the new
optimal solution.
The success of the dynamic solution depends on each
node being able to communicate its price signal to other
nodes. There may be a time delay associated with sharing
information within the network. Simulation experiments were
run to test the system’s sensitivity to delays in communicating
the price signals. This was done by updating the flows using the
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Fig. 1. Price adjustment when a new node arrives to the network [5].
route costs computed τ iterations previously so that Eqn. (5)
becomes
ωr(t) = νs ξs(r)(t− τ)+ νd ξd(r)(t− τ)+ νt
∑
j∈t(r)
ξj(t− τ).
Fig. 2 shows that the dynamic solution successfully adapts
provided the price delay is less than 12 iterations. See [5] for
a further investigation of the dynamic solution method.
III. THE EGOIST
Now consider the case where node i (the egoist) is selfish
and wants to maximise the utility of its flows. Node i increases
the flows on the routes r ∈ RS(i). Node i does not care about
the utility that any other node gets. However, node i cannot
influence flows that do not use node i so these flows remain at
their socially-optimal values. The egoist flows y = (yr)r∈RS(i)
are found by solving the optimisation problem [3]
max
y
∑
r∈RS(i)
Ur(yr)
subject to the constraints yr ≥ 0 for r ∈ R (the flows are
non-negative)
νs
∑
r∈RS(i)
yr ≤ Pi
(the flows originating from the egoist node i can use at most
Pi units of power at node i), and
νd
∑
r∈RS(i)∩RD(j)
yr + νt
∑
r∈RS(i)∩RT (j)
yr ≤ Pj − Cij
for j 6= i (the flows originating from the egoist node i can
use at most Pj − Cij units of power at node j). The power
at node j available to routes with source node i is reduced by
the socially-optimal power consumption Cij of routes that do
not go through node i. The egoist i has no control over these
routes.
Cij = νs
∑
r∈RS(j)\R(i)
y(s)r
+ νd
∑
r∈RD(j)\R(i)
y(s)r + νt
∑
r∈RT (j)\R(i)
y(s)r
(a) Time delay τ = 5
(b) Time delay τ = 12
(c) Time delay τ = 17
Fig. 2. Price at each node as a function of time [5].
where y(s)r is the socially-optimal flow on route r and R(i) ≡
RS(i) ∪RD(i) ∪RT (i).
The KKT conditions for optimality yield 2R+J equations
where R = |RS(i)| for the flows yr, the Lagrange multipliers
ηr for the flow constraints, and the Lagrange multipliers ξj
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(c) The utility of the outbound flows at the egoist node k at (x, y)
Fig. 3. Utility surfaces for the 16-node network model.
for the power constraints. The 2R+J simultaneous non-linear
equations can be solved using the NLP package CFSQP [4]
which provides a centralised solution method. We were not
able to design a distributed method to compute the egoist flows.
A. Utility as a function of location
Consider a network model with 16 nodes. The model
assumes a flat terrain of 100m × 100m that is partitioned
into a 4×4 grid of cells. The transmission range is D = 50m
and each cell is 25m×25m. One node is placed at the centre
of each cell so that the network is connected.
An additional node k (the tagged node) is successively
located at (xk, yk) where xk ∈ {0, 5, · · · , 100} and yk ∈
{0, 5, . . . , 100}. The routes are fixed. The cost C` of the link
` from node i to node j is given by
C` =
{
dij dij ≤ D
∞ otherwise
where dij is the euclidean distance from node i to node j. The
utility function is Ur(yr) = log(yr) where yr is the flow on
route r. The other parameters are νs = νd = 1, νt = 2 and
Pj = 0.5. The CFSQP NLP solver [4] was used to compute
the optimal allocation of the flows.
Fig. 3(a) presents the socially-optimal utility∑
r∈RS(k) Ur(yr) of the flows originating at node k
when node k is in position (xk, yk). The figure also shows
the utility contours projected onto the (x, y) plane.
• The utility of node k is low when node k is near a
corner of the (x, y) plane. In this case node k carries
no transit routes. Although the power at node k is
not fully used (the value of the Lagrange multiplier
ξk for the power constraint at node k is zero), it is
not optimal to assign large flows to the relatively long
routes that originate from node k.
• The utility of node k is also low when node k is near
the centre of the (x, y) plane. In this case node k
carries many transit routes. The power at node k is
fully used (the Lagrange multiplier ξk > 0) but only a
small amount of power is available at node k for it to
send its own flows, most of the power being used to
relay flows that transit through node k and to accept
flows that terminate at node k
Fig. 3(b) presents the socially-optimal total utility∑
r∈R Ur(yr) when node k is in position (xk, yk)
• The total utility is low when node k is at the corner of
the network where it can only originate small flows.
• The total utility is large when node k is near the centre
of the network. In this case node k provides transit
services to many routes thus relieving other nodes near
the centre of network from functioning as transit nodes
so that they have sufficient power to originate large
flows.
We next examine the case when all nodes are altruistic nodes
except node k which is an egoist node. Fig. 3(c) presents the
utility of the outbound flows at the egoist node k. The utility is
large when the egoist node k is near the centre of the network
where it can use all the power at node k to send large flows
on relatively short routes to most destinations.
IV. AN EGOIST VARIANT: PRICE MANIPULATION
The egoist user can exhibit many different types of selfish
behaviour. For example, the egoist could communicate a price
of zero to the other nodes. Once the egoist had attracted a
large volume of traffic (the extrinsic flows), the egoist could
substitute its own flow for its transit flow. Such behavior
would leave the prices unaffected at the downstream nodes
although the misbehaviour could be detected by downstream
nodes observing that the extrinsic flows had been dropped.
However, this detection mechanism would not scale as it would
require per flow state information be kept at each node. Nodes
upstream from the egoist may be unaware that their flows
through and to the egoist are being dropped. These flows
represent a waste of network resources since they cannot reach
their destinations, neither can these resources used by these
flows be seized by the egoist.
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(a) Originating flows at the egoist node 10
(b) Terminating flows at the egoist node 10
(c) Transit flows at the egoist node 10
Fig. 4. Price manipulation.
A. Advertising false prices
The question arises if it is possible for the egoist to
disguise its misbehaviour from the other nodes and acquire
resources from upstream and downstream nodes. Consider an
egoist that communicates an increasingly false price to the
other nodes in the network so that these nodes are slowly
discouraged from using the egoist node. As a consequence
of the perceived inflated resource price at the egoist, flows
through the egoist node are gradually attenuated as the other
nodes are discouraged from using the egoist. The fraud is likely
Fig. 5. Price manipulation.
to be undetected. The unused capacity at the egoist node and
elsewhere can now be used by the egoist to send its own flows
– the egoist uses the correct price when it sends its own flows.
Fig. 4 shows the originating, terminating and transit flows
at node 10 which is located at the centre of a 10-node network
on a 100m × 100m plane as introduced above. The utility
function is
Ur(yr) = log(yr)
where yr is the flow on route r. The other parameters are νs =
1, νd =, νt = 2 and Pj = 0.5. Node 10 initially advertises
true resources prices and the flows converge to their socially-
optimal values. One third of the way though the simulation
node 10 gradually increases its prices and communicates these
inflated prices to the rest of the network. Fig. 4(a) shows that
the flows originating at the egoist node 10 increase, to the
detriment of the originating flows at all the other nodes. Figs.
4(b) and 4(c) show that the flows terminating at and transiting
through the egoist node 10 are attenuated.
B. Retaliatory pricing strategies
The nodes can deploy reactive strategies to retaliate against
nodes that are perceived as misbehaving. Consider the 10-
node network introduced above, and let the network move
through six stages. Fig. 5 shows that initially when all nodes
advertise true resource prices, the flows converge to their
socially-optimal values. Next, the egoist node 10 advertises
false prices and the egoist benefits to the detriment of the other
nodes. Then node 10 advertises true prices and the flows return
to their socially-optimal values. Once again, node 10 advertises
false prices and the egoist benefits. This time the other nodes
retaliate by advertising false (inflated) prices to the egoist. The
prices that the altruistic nodes communicate among themselves
remain at their true values. The egoist flows are decreased but
the flows do not return to their socially-optimal values. Finally
all nodes advertise true prices and the flows are restored to their
socially-optimal values.
V. TIME-VARYING PRICES
In this section we investigate the impact of a time varying
utility function on the price of the resources in the network.
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(a) U(yr(t)) = a sin(bt) log(yr(t))
(b) U(yr(t)) = (a sin(bt+ 2piU(0, 1) + 1) log(yr(t))
Fig. 6. Time dependent utility function.
The 10-node network model of the previous section is used.
The flow allocations are computed using the dynamic solution
method. The flows could also be computed using the CFSQP
NLP solver [4] but the computation would be slow and,
depending upon the periodicity of the cyclic variations, might
be numerically unstable.
We use a time-varying utility function
U(yr(t)) = (a sin(bt+ 2piU(0, 1)) + 1) log(yr)
where U(0, 1) is a uniform deviate to introduce phase dif-
ferences among the flows on the various routes. The phase
differences ensure that the route utilities do not all increase or
all decrease simultaneously. If a = 0 we have the logarithmic
utility function. Increasing the value of b introduces high
frequency oscillations in the utility function.
Fig. 6(a) shows the price of power at the various nodes
of the network when a = 0.2 and b = 1.0 with no random
phase differences. The flows converge and reflect the sinusoidal
variation of the utility function. Fig. 6(b) shows the price of
power at the various nodes of the network when a = 1.0 and
b = 0.5 with random phase differences. The flows display the
effect of the phase-induced jitter that is superimposed upon a
sinusoidal variation in the utility function.
VI. CONCLUSION
Optimal flow allocation in a network of static wireless
nodes can be modelled as a constrained nonlinear optimisation
problem. This problem can be solved either by standard
methods which assume global knowledge of the system being
modelled, or by a dynamic algorithm which assumes local
knowledge only. We present such a dynamic algorithm and use
it to evaluate the performance of a small 10-node network.
We next consider an ad hoc network which contains selfish
nodes. A selfish node cares only about maximising its own
flows and does not care about the utility that any other nodes
get. We modify the behaviour of the selfish nodes so that a
dynamic solution is possible. In this scheme, selfish nodes
advertise false (inflated) resource prices to the other nodes.
These nodes respond by not routing their flows through the
selfish nodes, and the selfish nodes can now can use all their
resources to transmit their own flows. The flows return to their
socially-optimal values if the selfish nodes advertise the correct
prices for their resources.
Altruistic nodes can detect the inflated prices charged by
the selfish nodes and respond by advertising false (inflated)
prices to the selfish nodes. In this case the flows originating
at the selfish nodes are reduced, but the flows do not return
to their socially-optimal values. This scheme also has a dis-
tributed solution.
Dynamic solution methods are also valuable in situations
where the node positions, their utility functions or other
parameters, vary with time. The network adjusts its emitted
flows in a decentralised way so that good performance in terms
of tracking the overall utility is produced. We finally present
several experiments where the dynamic solution method was
used to evaluate network models where the utility is a function
of time.
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